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Abstract
In 2-player non-zero-sum games, Nash equilibria capture the options for rational behavior if each player attempts to maximize
her payoff. In contrast to classical game theory, we consider lexicographic objectives: ﬁrst, each player tries to maximize her own
payoff, and then, the player tries to minimize the opponent’s payoff. Such objectives arise naturally in the veriﬁcation of systems with
multiple components. There, instead of proving that each component satisﬁes its speciﬁcation no matter how the other components
behave, it sometimes sufﬁces to prove that each component satisﬁes its speciﬁcation provided that the other components satisfy
their speciﬁcations. We say that a Nash equilibrium is secure if it is an equilibrium with respect to the lexicographic objectives
of both players. We prove that in graph games with Borel winning conditions, which include the games that arise in veriﬁcation,
there may be several Nash equilibria, but there is always a unique maximal payoff proﬁle of a secure equilibrium. We show how
this equilibrium can be computed in the case of -regular winning conditions, and we characterize the memory requirements of
strategies that achieve the equilibrium.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We consider 2-player non-zero-sum games, i.e., non-strictly competitive games. A possible behavior of the two
players is captured by a strategy proﬁle (, ), where  is a strategy of player 1, and  is a strategy of player 2.
Classically, the behavior (, ) is considered rational if the strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium [14]—that is, if
neither player can increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. Formally, let v,1 be the payoff of player 1
if the strategies (, ) are played, and let v,2 be the corresponding payoff of player 2. Then (, ) is a Nash equilibrium
if (1) v,1 v
′,
1 for all player 1 strategies 
′
, and (2) v,2 v,
′
2 for all player 2 strategies 
′
. Nash equilibria formalize
a notion of rationality which is strictly internal: each player cares about her own payoff but does not in the least care
(cooperatively or adversarially) about the other player’s payoff.
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Choosing among Nash equilibria. A classical problem is that many games have multiple Nash equilibria, and some
of them may be preferable to others. For example, one might partially order the equilibria by (, )(′, ′) if both
v
,
1 v
′,′
1 and v
,
2 v
′,′
2 . If a unique maximal Nash equilibrium exists in this order, then it is preferable for both
players. However, maximal Nash equilibria may not be unique. In such cases external criteria, such as the sum of
the payoffs for both players, have been used to evaluate different rational behaviors [8,15,21]. These external criteria,
which are based on a single preference order on strategy proﬁles, are usually cooperative, in that they capture social
aspects of rational behavior. We deﬁne and study, instead, an adversarial external criterion for rational behavior. Put
simply, we assume that each player attempts to minimize the other player’s payoff as long as, by doing so, she does not
decrease her own payoff. This yields two different preference orders on strategy proﬁles, one for each player. Among
two strategy proﬁles (, ) and (′, ′), player 1 prefers (, ), denoted (, )1(′, ′), if either v,1 > v
′,′
1 , or both
v
,
1 = v
′,′
1 and v
,
2 v
′,′
2 . In other words, the preference order 1 of player 1 is lexicographic: the primary goal
of player 1 is to maximize her own payoff; the secondary goal is to minimize the opponent’s payoff. The preference
order 2 of player 2 is deﬁned symmetrically. We refer to rational behaviors under these lexicographic objectives as
secure equilibria. (We do not know how to uniformly translate all games with lexicographic preference orders to games
with a single objective for each player, such that the Nash equilibria of the translated games correspond to the secure
equilibria of the original games.)
Secure equilibria. The two orders 1 and 2 on strategy proﬁles, which express the preferences of the two players,
induce the following reﬁnement of the notion of Nash equilibrium: a strategy proﬁle (, ) is a secure equilibrium if (1)
(v
,
1 , v
,
2 )1(v
′,
1 , v
′,
2 ) for all player 1 strategies 
′
, and (2) (v,1 , v,2 )2(v,
′
1 , v
,′
2 ) for all player 2 strategies
′. Note that every secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but a Nash equilibrium need not be secure. The name
“secure” equilibrium derives from the following equivalent characterization. We say that a strategy proﬁle (, ) is
secure if any rational deviation of player 2—i.e., a deviation that does not decrease her payoff—will not decrease
the payoff of player 1, and symmetrically, any rational deviation of player 1 will not decrease the payoff of player 2.
Formally, a strategy proﬁle (, ) is secure if for all player 2 strategies ′, if v,
′
2 v
,
2 then v
,′
1 v
,
1 , and for all
player 1 strategies ′, if v
′,
1 v
,
1 then v
′,
2 v
,
2 . The secure proﬁle (, ) can thus be interpreted as a contract
between the two players which enforces cooperation: any unilateral selﬁsh deviation by one player cannot put the other
player at a disadvantage if she follows the contract. It is not difﬁcult to show (see Section 2) that a strategy proﬁle is
a secure equilibrium iff it is both a secure proﬁle and a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the secure equilibria are those Nash
equilibria which represent enforceable contracts between the two players.
Motivation: veriﬁcation of component-based systems. The motivation for our deﬁnitions comes from veriﬁcation.
There, one would like to prove that a component of a system (player 1) can satisfy a speciﬁcation no matter how
the environment (player 2) behaves [3]. Classically, this is modeled as a strictly competitive (zero-sum) game, where
the environment’s objective is the complement of the component’s objective. However, the zero-sum model is often
overly conservative, as the environment itself typically consists of components, each with its own speciﬁcation (i.e.,
objective). Moreover, the individual component speciﬁcations are usually not complementary; a common example is
that each component must maintain a local invariant. So a more appropriate approach is to prove that player 1 can meet
her objective no matter how player 2 behaves as long as player 2 does not sabotage her own objective. In other words,
classical correctness proofs of a component assume absolute worst-case behavior of the environment, while it would
sufﬁce to assume only relative worst-case behavior of the environment—namely, relative to the assumption that the
environment itself is correct (i.e., meets its speciﬁcation). Such relative worst-case reasoning, called assume–guarantee
reasoning [1,2,13], so far has not been studied in the natural setting offered by game theory.
Existence and uniqueness of maximal secure equilibria. We will see that in general games, such as matrix games,
there may be multiple secure equilibrium payoff proﬁles, even several incomparable maximal ones. However, the
games that occur in veriﬁcation have a special form. They are played on directed graphs whose nodes represent system
states, and whose edges represent system transitions. The nodes are partitioned into two sets: in player 1 nodes, the
ﬁrst player chooses an outgoing edge, and in player 2 nodes, the second player chooses an outgoing edge. By repeating
these choices ad inﬁnitum, an inﬁnite path through the graph is formed, which represents a system trace. The objective
i of each player i ∈ {1, 2} is a set of inﬁnite paths. For example, an invariant (or “safety”) objective is the set of
inﬁnite paths that do not visit unsafe states. Each player i attempts to satisfy her objectivei by choosing a strategy that
ensures that the outcome of the game lies in the set i . The objective i is typically an -regular set [19] (speciﬁed,
e.g., in temporal logic [10]), or more generally, a Borel set [7] in the Cantor topology on inﬁnite paths. We call such
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s1 s0
s2
R2 s3 s4
Fig. 1. A graph game with reachability objectives.
s3
s1 s0
B1
B2 s4 s2
Fig. 2. A graph game with Büchi objectives.
games 2-player non-zero-sum graph games with Borel objectives. Our main result shows that for these games, which
may have multiple maximal Nash equilibria, there always exists a unique maximal secure equilibrium payoff proﬁle.
In other words, in graph games with Borel objectives there is a compelling notion of rational behavior for each player,
which is (1) a classical Nash equilibrium, (2) an enforceable contract (“secure”), and (3) a guarantee of maximal payoff
for each player among all behaviors that achieve (1) and (2).
Examples. Consider the game graph shown in Fig. 1. Player 1 chooses the successor node at square nodes and her
objective is to reach the target s4, a reachability (co-safety) objective. Player 2 chooses the successor node at diamond
nodes and her objective is to reach s3 or s4, also a reachability objective. There are two player 1 strategies: the strategy
1 chooses the move s0 → s1, and 2 chooses s0 → s2. There are also two player 2 strategies: the strategy 1 chooses
s1 → s3, and 2 chooses s1 → s4. The strategy proﬁle (1, 1) leads the game into s3 and therefore gives the payoff
proﬁle (0,1), indicating that player 1 loses and player 2 wins (i.e., only player 2 reaches her target). The strategy proﬁles
(1, 2), (2, 1), and (2, 2) give the payoffs (1,1), (0,0), and (0,0), respectively. All four strategy proﬁles are Nash
equilibria. For example, in (1, 1) player 1 does not have an incentive to switch to strategy 2 (which would still give
her payoff 0), and neither does player 2 have an incentive to switch to 2 (she is already getting payoff 1). However,
the strategy proﬁle (1, 1) is not a secure equilibrium, because player 2 can lower player 1’s payoff (from 1 to 0)
without changing her own payoff by switching to strategy 2. Similarly, the strategy proﬁle (1, 2) is not secure,
because player 1 can lower player 2’s payoff without changing her own payoff by switching to 2. So if both players,
in addition to maximizing their own payoff, also attempt to minimize the opponents payoff, then the resulting payoff
proﬁle is unique, namely, (0,0). In other words, in this game, the only rational behavior for both players is to deny each
other’s objectives.
This is not always the case: sometimes it is beneﬁcial for both players to cooperate to achieve their own objectives,
with the result that both players win. Consider the game graph shown in Fig. 2. Both players have Büchi objectives:
player 1 (square) wants to visit s0 inﬁnitely often, and player 2 (diamond) wants to visit s4 inﬁnitely often. If player
1 always chooses s1 → s0 and player 2 always chooses s2 → s4, then both players win. This Nash equilibrium is
also secure: if player 1 deviates by choosing s2 → s0, then player 2 can “retaliate” by choosing s0 → s3; similarly, if
player 2 deviates by choosing s1 → s2, then player 2 can retaliate by s2 → s3. It follows that for purely selﬁsh motives
(and not some social reason), both players have an incentive to cooperate to achieve the maximal secure equilibrium
payoff (1, 1).
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Outline and results. In Section 2, we deﬁne the notion of secure equilibrium and give several interpretations through
alternative deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we prove the existence and uniqueness of maximal secure equilibria in graph games
with Borel objectives. The proof is based on the following classiﬁcation of strategies. A player 1 strategy is called
strongly winning if it ensures that player 1 wins and player 2 loses (i.e., the outcome of the game satisﬁes 1 ∧ ¬2).
A player 1 strategy is a retaliating strategy if it ensures that if player 2 wins, then player 1 wins (i.e., the outcome
satisﬁes 2 → 1). In other words, a retaliating strategy for player 1 ensures that if player 2 causes player 1 to lose,
then player 2 will lose too. If both players follow retaliating strategies (, ), they may both win—in this case, we say
that (, ) is a winning pair of retaliating strategies—or they may both lose. We show that at every node of a graph
game with Borel objectives, either one of the two players has a strongly winning strategy, or there is a pair of retaliating
strategies. Based on this insight, we give an algorithm for computing the secure equilibria in graph games in the case
that both players’ objectives are -regular. In Section 4, we analyze the memory requirements of strongly winning
and retaliating strategies in graph games with -regular objectives. Our results (in Tables 1 and 2) consider safety,
reachability, Büchi, co-Büchi, and general parity objectives. We show that strongly winning and retaliating strategies
often require memory, even in the simple case that a player pursues a reachability objective. In Section 5, we generalize
the notion of secure equilibria from 2-player to n-player games. We show that there can be multiple maximal secure
equilibria in 3-player graph games with reachability objectives.
2. Secure equilibria
In a secure game the objective of player 1 is to maximize her own payoff and then minimize the payoff of
player 2. Similarly, player 2 maximizes her own payoff and then minimizes the payoff of player 1. We want to
determine the best payoff that each player can ensure when both players play according to these preferences. We
formalize this as follows. A strategy proﬁle (, ) is a pair of strategies, where  is a player 1 strategy and  is a player
2 strategy. The strategy proﬁle (, ) gives rise to a payoff proﬁle (v,1 , v,2 ), where v,1 is the payoff of player 1 if
the two players follow the strategies  and  respectively, and v,2 is the corresponding payoff of player 2. We deﬁne
the player 1 preference order 1 and the player 2 preference order 2 on payoff proﬁles lexicographically:
(v1, v2) ≺1 (v′1, v′2) iff (v1 < v′1) ∨ (v1 = v′1 ∧ v2 > v′2),
that is, player 1 prefers a payoff proﬁle which gives her greater payoff, and if two payoff proﬁles match in the ﬁrst
component, then she prefers the payoff proﬁle in which player 2’s payoff is minimized. Symmetrically,
(v1, v2) ≺2 (v′1, v′2) iff (v2 < v′2) ∨ (v2 = v′2 ∧ v1 > v′1).
Given two payoff proﬁles (v1, v2) and (v′1, v′2), we write (v1, v2) = (v′1, v′2) iff v1 = v′1 and v2 = v′2, and (v1, v2)1
(v′1, v′2) iff either (v1, v2) ≺1 (v′1, v′2) or (v1, v2) = (v′1, v′2). We deﬁne 2 analogously.
Deﬁnition 1 (Secure strategy proﬁles). A strategy proﬁle (, ) is secure if the following two conditions hold:
∀′.(v,′1 < v,1 ) → (v,
′
2 < v
,
2 ),
∀′.(v′,2 < v,2 ) → (v
′,
1 < v
,
1 ).
A secure strategy for player 1 ensures that if player 2 tries to decrease player 1’s payoff, then player 2’s payoff
decreases as well, and vice versa.
Deﬁnition 2 (Secure equilibria). A strategy proﬁle (, ) is a Nash equilibrium if (1) v,1 v
′,
1 for all player 1
strategies ′, and (2) v,2 v,
′
2 for all player 2 strategies 
′
. A strategy proﬁle is a secure equilibrium if it is both a
Nash equilibrium and secure.
Proposition 1 (Equivalent characterization). The strategy proﬁle (, ) is a secure equilibrium iff the following two
conditions hold:
∀′. (v,′1 , v,
′
2 )2(v
,
1 , v
,
2 ),
∀′. (v′,1 , v
′,
2 )1(v
,
1 , v
,
2 ).
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Proof. Consider a strategy proﬁle (, )which is a Nash equilibrium and secure. Since (, ) is a Nash equilibrium, for
all player 2 strategies′, we have v,
′
2 v
,
2 . Since (, ) is secure, for all
′
, we have (v,
′
1 < v
,
1 ) → (v,
′
2 < v
,
2 ).
It follows that for every player 2 strategy ′, the following condition holds:
(v
,′
2 = v,2 ∧ v,1 v,
′
1 ) ∨ (v,
′
2 < v
,
2 ).
Hence, for all ′, we have (v,
′
1 , v
,′
2 )2 (v
,
1 , v
,
2 ). The argument for the other case is symmetric. Thus neither
player 1 nor player 2 has any incentive to switch from the strategy proﬁle (, ) in order to increase the payoff proﬁle
according to their respective payoff proﬁle ordering.
Conversely, an equilibrium strategy proﬁle (, ) with respect to the preference orders 1 and 2 is both a Nash
equilibrium and a secure strategy proﬁle. 
Example 1 (Matrix games). A secure equilibrium need not exist in a matrix game. We give an example of a matrix
game where no Nash equilibrium is secure. Consider the game M1 below, where the row player can choose row 1 or
row 2 (denoted r1 and r2, respectively), and the column player chooses between the two columns (denoted c1 and c2).
The ﬁrst component of the payoff is the row player payoff and the second component is the column player payoff.
M1 =
[
(3, 3) (1, 3)
(3, 1) (2, 2)
]
In this game the strategy proﬁle (r1, c1) is the only Nash equilibrium. But (r1, c1) is not a secure strategy proﬁle,
because if the row player plays r1, then the column player playing c2 can still get payoff 3 and decrease the row player’s
payoff to 1.
In the game M2 below, there are two Nash equilibria, namely, (r1, c2) and (r2, c1), and the strategy proﬁle (r2, c1)
is a secure strategy proﬁle as well. Hence the strategy proﬁle (r2, c1) is a secure equilibrium. However, the strategy
proﬁle (r1, c2) is not secure.
M2 =
[
(0, 0) (1, 0)
( 12 ,
1
2 ) (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
]
Multiple secure equilibria may exist, as in the case, for example, in a matrix game where all entries of the matrix are
the same. We now present an example of a matrix game with multiple secure equilibria with different payoff proﬁles.
Consider the following matrix game M3. The strategy proﬁles (r1, c1) and (r2, c2) are both secure equilibria. The
former has the payoff proﬁle (2, 1), and the latter, the payoff proﬁle (1, 2). These two payoff proﬁles are incomparable:
player 1 prefers the former, player 2 the latter. Hence, in this case, there is not a unique maximal secure payoff proﬁle.
M3 =
[
(2, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 2)
]
3. 2-Player non-zero-sum games on graphs
We consider 2-player inﬁnite path-forming games played on graphs. We restrict our attention to turn-based games
and pure (i.e., non-randomized) strategies. In turn-based games, the players take turns to extend a path through the
graph. In these games, the class of pure strategies sufﬁces for determinacy [11], and, as we shall see, for the existence
of equilibria (both Nash and secure equilibria).
Game graphs. A game graph G = ((S,E), (S1, S2)) consists of a directed graph (S,E), where S is the set of states
(vertices) and E is the set of edges, and a partition (S1, S2) of the states. For technical convenience we assume that
every state has at least one outgoing edge. The two players, player 1 and player 2, keep moving a token along the edges
of the game graph: player 1 moves the token from states in S1, and player 2 moves the token from states in S2. The size
of the game graph G is |S| + |E|.
Plays and strategies. A play is an inﬁnite path  = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 through the game graph, that is, (sk, sk+1) ∈ E
for all k0. A strategy for player 1, given a preﬁx of a play (i.e., a ﬁnite sequence of states), speciﬁes a next state to
extend the play. Formally, a strategy for player 1 is a function : S∗ · S1 → S such that for all x ∈ S∗ and s ∈ S1,
we have (s, (x · s)) ∈ E. A strategy  for player 2 is deﬁned symmetrically. We write  and  to denote the sets of
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strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. A strategy is memoryless if it is independent of the history of play.
Formally, a strategy  of player i, where i ∈ {1, 2}, is memoryless if (x · s) = (x′ · s) for all x, x′ ∈ S∗ and all s ∈ Si ;
hence a memoryless strategy of player i can be represented as a function : Si → S. A play  = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 is
consistent with a strategy  of player i if for all k0, if sk ∈ Si , then sk+1 = (s0, s1, . . . , sk). Given a state s ∈ S,
a strategy  of player 1, and a strategy  of player 2, there is a unique play ,(s), the outcome of the game, which
starts from s and is consistent with both  and .
Objectives. Weﬁx a game graphGwith state space S. Objectives of the players are speciﬁed as sets ⊆ S of inﬁnite
paths.Wewrite instead of ∈  for an inﬁnite path and objective.We use boolean operators such as∨,∧, and
¬ on objectives to denote set union, intersection, and complement, respectively. We deﬁne Borel objectives and several
subclasses thereof. For an inﬁnite path  = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉, let Inf() = {s ∈ S : sk = s for inﬁnitely many k0}
be the set of states that occur inﬁnitely often in . Given state sets R,F,B,C ⊆ S, various classes of objectives are
deﬁned as follows:
• Reachability objectives: The reachability objective R requires that the set R be visited at least once. Formally, we
have R = {〈s0, s1, s2 . . .〉 ∈ S : ∃k. sk ∈ R}. We refer to R as the target set.
• Safety objectives: The safety objective F requires that only states in F be visited. Formally, we have F =
{〈s0, s1, s2 . . .〉 ∈ S : ∀k. sk ∈ F }. We refer to F as the safe set.
• Büchi objectives: The Büchi objective B requires that the set B be visited inﬁnitely often. Formally, we have
B = { ∈ S : Inf() ∩ B = ∅}. We refer to B as the Büchi set.
• co-Büchi objectives: The co-Büchi objective C requires that the set S\C be visited ﬁnitely often. Formally, we have
C = { ∈ S : Inf() ⊆ C}. We refer to C as the co-Büchi set.
• Parity objectives: For d ∈ N, we write [d] to denote the set {0, 1, . . . , d}, and [d]+ = {1, 2, . . . , d}. We are given
a function P : S → [d] that assigns a priority P(s) to every state s ∈ S. The parity (or Rabin chain) objective
P requires that the minimum priority that is visited inﬁnitely often be even. Formally, we have P = { ∈ S :
min(P (Inf())) is even}.
• Borel objectives: The reachability and safety objectives are the open and closed sets in the Cantor topology on S,
respectively. In other words, the classes of reachability and safety objectives form the lowest level of the Borel
hierarchy, 1 and1, respectively. For i > 1, the classes i+1 andi+1 of Borel objectives are obtained by taking
countable unions and countable intersections of objectives in i and i , respectively. The Borel hierarchy is the
inﬁnite hierarchy of classes of objectives thus obtained. A Borel objective is an objective that lies in some Borel
class.
The Borel objectives are the most general class of objectives considered in graph games. In veriﬁcation, objectives
are usually -regular sets [18]. The -regular sets occur in the lower levels of the Borel hierarchy (in 3 ∩3) and
form a robust and expressive class for determining the payoffs of commonly used system speciﬁcations. In partic-
ular, all objectives deﬁnable in linear temporal logic (LTL) are -regular [10]. Every -regular set can be deﬁned
as a parity objective [19]. For example, Büchi and co-Büchi objectives are parity objectives with two priorities:
in the Büchi case, take the priority function P : S → [1] such that P(s) = 0 if s ∈ B, and P(s) = 1 other-
wise; in the co-Büchi case, take the priority function P : S → [2]+ such that P(s) = 2 if s ∈ C, and P(s) = 1
otherwise.
The following celebrated result of Martin establishes that all games with Borel objectives are determined.
Theorem 1 (Borel determinacy [11]). For every 2-player game graph G, every state s, and every Borel objective ,
either (1) there is a strategy  of player 1 such that for all strategies ′ of player 2, we have ,′(s), or (2) there
is a strategy  of player 2 such that for all strategies ′ of player 1, we have ′,(s)¬.
We consider non-zero-sum games on graphs. For our purposes, a graph game (G, s,1,2) consists of a game graph
G, say with state space S, together with a start state s ∈ S and two Borel objectives 1,2 ⊆ S. The game starts at
state s, player 1 pursues the objective 1, and player 2 pursues the objective 2 (in general, 2 is not the complement
of 1). Player i ∈ {1, 2} gets payoff 1 if the outcome of the game is a member of i , and she gets payoff 0 otherwise.
In the following, we ﬁx the game graph G and the objectives 1 and 2, but we vary the start state s of the game. Thus
we parameterize the payoffs by s: given strategies  and  for the two players, we write v,i (s) = 1 if ,(s)i ,
and v,i (s) = 0 otherwise, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly, we sometimes refer to Nash equilibria and secure strategy proﬁles
of the graph game (G, s,1,2) as equilibria and secure proﬁles at the state s.
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In Section 3.1, we investigate the existence and structure of secure equilibria for the general class of graph games
with Borel objectives. In Section 3.2, we give a characterization of secure equilibria for general Borel objectives which
can be used to compute secure equilibria in the special case of -regular objectives.
3.1. Unique maximal secure equilibria
Consider a game graph G with state space S, and Borel objectives 1 and 2 for the two players.
Deﬁnition 3 (Maximal secure equilibria). For v,w ∈ {0, 1}, we write SEvw ⊆ S to denote the set of states s such that
a secure equilibrium with the payoff proﬁle (v,w) exists in the graph game (G, s,1,2); that is, s ∈ SEvw iff there
is a secure equilibrium (, ) at s such that (v,1 (s), v
,
2 (s)) = (v,w). Similarly, MSvw ⊆ SEvw denotes the set of
states s such that the payoff proﬁle (v,w) is a maximal secure equilibrium payoff proﬁle at s; that is, s ∈ MSvw iff (1)
s ∈ SEvw and (2) for all v′, w′ ∈ {0, 1}, if s ∈ SEv′w′ , then (v′, w′)1(v,w) and (v′, w′)2(v,w).
We now deﬁne the notions of strongly winning and retaliating strategies, which capture the essence of secure
equilibria. A strategy for player 1 is strongly winning if it ensures that the objective of player 1 is satisﬁed and the
objective of player 2 is not. A retaliating strategy for player 1 ensures that for every strategy of player 2, if the objective
of player 2 is satisﬁed, then the objective of player 1 is satisﬁed as well. We will show that every secure equilibrium
either contains a strongly winning strategy for one of the players, or it consists of a pair of retaliating strategies.
Deﬁnition 4 (Strongly winning strategies). A strategy  is strongly winning for player 1 from a state s if she can ensure
the payoff proﬁle (1, 0) in the graph game (G, s,1,2) by playing the strategy . Formally,  is strongly winning
for player 1 from s if for all player 2 strategies , we have ,(s) (1 ∧ ¬2). The strongly winning strategies for
player 2 are deﬁned symmetrically.
Deﬁnition 5 (Retaliating strategies). A strategy  is a retaliating strategy for player 1 from a state s if for all player
2 strategies , we have ,(s) (2 → 1). Similarly, a strategy  is a retaliating strategy for player 2 from s if for
all player 1 strategies , we have ,(s) (1 → 2). We write Re1(s) and Re2(s) to denote the sets of retaliating
strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively, from s. A strategy proﬁle (, ) is a retaliation strategy proﬁle at
a state s if both  and  are retaliating strategies from s. The retaliation strategy proﬁle (, ) is winning at s if
,(s) (1 ∧2). A strategy  is a winning retaliating strategy for player 1 at state s if there is a strategy  for player
2 such that (, ) is a winning retaliation strategy proﬁle at s.
Example 2 (Büchi–Büchi game). Recall the graph game shown in Fig. 2. Consider the memoryless strategies of player
2 at state s0. If player 2 chooses s0 → s3, then player 2 does not satisfy her Büchi objective. If player 2 chooses s0 → s2,
then at state s2 player 1 chooses s2 → s0, and hence player 1’s objective is satisﬁed, but player 2’s objective is not
satisﬁed. Thus, no memoryless strategy for player 2 can be a winning retaliating strategy at s0.
Now consider the strategy g for player 2 which chooses s0 → s2 if between the last two consecutive visits to
s0 the state s4 was visited, and otherwise it chooses s0 → s3. Given this strategy, for every strategy of player 1 that
satisﬁes player 1’s objective, player 2’s objective is also satisﬁed. Let g be the player 1 strategy that chooses s2 → s4
if between the last two consecutive visits to s2 the state s0 was visited, and otherwise chooses s2 → s3. The strategy
proﬁle (g, g) consists of a pair of winning retaliating strategies, as it satisﬁes the Büchi objectives of both players. If
instead, player 2 always chooses s0 → s3, and player 1 always chooses s2 → s3, we obtain a memoryless retaliation
strategy proﬁle, which is not winning for either player: it is a Nash equilibrium at state s0 with the payoff proﬁle (0, 0).
Finally, suppose that at s0 player 2 always chooses s2, and at s2 player 1 always chooses s0. This strategy proﬁle is
again a Nash equilibrium, with the payoff proﬁle (0, 1) at s0, but not a retaliation strategy proﬁle. This shows that at
state s0 the Nash equilibrium payoff proﬁles (0, 1), (0, 0), and (1, 1) are possible, but only (0, 0) and (1, 1) are secure.
Given a game graph G with state space S, and a set  ⊆ S of inﬁnite paths, we deﬁne the sets of states from which
player 1 or player 2, respectively, can win a zero-sum game with objective , as follows:
〈〈1〉〉G() = {s ∈ S : ∃ ∈ . ∀ ∈ . ,(s)},
〈〈2〉〉G() = {s ∈ S : ∃ ∈ . ∀ ∈ . ,(s)}.
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The set of states from which the two players can cooperate to satisfy the objective  is,
〈〈1, 2〉〉G() = {s ∈ S : ∃ ∈ . ∃ ∈ . ,(s)}.
We omit the subscript G when the game graph is clear from the context. Let s be a state in 〈〈1, 2〉〉(), and let (, ) be
a strategy proﬁle such that ,(s). Then we say that (, ) is a cooperative strategy proﬁle at s.
Deﬁnition 6 (Characterization of states). For the given game graph G and Borel objectives 1, 2, we deﬁne the
following four state sets in terms of strongly winning and retaliating strategies.
• The sets of states where player 1 or player 2, respectively, has a strongly winning strategy:
W10 = 〈〈1〉〉G(1 ∧ ¬2),
W01 = 〈〈2〉〉G(2 ∧ ¬1).
• The set of states where both players have retaliating strategies, and there exists a retaliation strategy proﬁle whose
strategies satisfy the objectives of both players:
W11 = {s ∈ S : ∃ ∈ Re1(s). ∃ ∈ Re2(s). ,(s) (1 ∧ 2)}.
• The set of states where both players have retaliating strategies and for every retaliation strategy proﬁle, neither the
objective of player 1 nor the objective of player 2 is satisﬁed:
W00 = {s ∈ S : Re1(s) = ∅ and Re2(s) = ∅ and ∀ ∈ Re1(s). ∀ ∈ Re2(s). ,(s) (¬1 ∧ ¬2)}.
Weﬁrst show that the four setsW10,W01,W11, andW00 form a partition of the state space. In the zero-sum case, where
2 = ¬1, the sets W10 and W01 specify the winning states for players 1 and 2, respectively; furthermore, W11 = ∅
by deﬁnition, and W00 = ∅ by determinacy. We also show that for all v,w ∈ {0, 1}, we have MSvw = Wvw. It follows
that for 2-player graph games (1) secure equilibria always exist, and moreover, (2) there is always a unique maximal
secure equilibrium payoff proﬁle. (Example 2 showed that there can be multiple secure equilibria with different payoff
proﬁles). This result fully characterizes each state of a 2-player non-zero-sum graph game with Borel objectives by a
maximal secure equilibria proﬁle, just like the determinacy result (Theorem 1) fully characterizes the zero-sum case.
The proof proceeds in several steps.
Lemma 1. W10 = {s ∈ S : Re2(s) = ∅} and W01 = {s ∈ S : Re1(s) = ∅}.
Proof. First, W10 ⊆ {s ∈ S : Re2(s) = ∅}, because a strongly winning strategy of player 1—i.e., a strategy to satisfy
1 ∧ ¬2 against every strategy of player 2—is a witness to exhibit that there is no retaliating strategy for player
2. Second, it follows from Borel determinacy (Theorem 1) that from each state s in S\W10 there is a strategy  of
player 2 to satisfy ¬1 ∨ 2 against every strategy of player 1. The strategy  is a retaliating strategy for player 2.
Hence S\W10 ⊆ {s ∈ S : Re2(s) = ∅}, and therefore W10 = {s ∈ S : Re2(s) = ∅}. The proof that W01 = {s ∈ S :
Re1(s) = ∅} is symmetric. 
Lemma 2. Consider the following two sets:
T1 = {s ∈ S : ∀ ∈ Re1(s). ∀ ∈ Re2(s). ,(s) (¬1 ∧ ¬2)},
T2 = {s ∈ S : ∀ ∈ Re1(s). ∀ ∈ Re2(s). ,(s) (¬1 ∨ ¬2)}.
Then T1 = T2.
Proof. The inclusion T1 ⊆ T2 follows from the fact that (¬1 ∧ ¬2) → (¬1 ∨ ¬2). We show that T2 ⊆ T1. By
the deﬁnition of retaliating strategies, if  is a retaliating strategy of player 1, then for all strategies  of player 2, we
have ,(s) (2 → 1), and thus ,(s) (¬1 → ¬2). Symmetrically, if  is a retaliating strategy of player
2, then for all strategies  of player 1, we have ,(s) (¬2 → ¬1). Hence, given a retaliation strategy proﬁle
(, ), we have ,(s) (¬1 ∨ ¬2) iff ,(s) (¬1 ∧ ¬2). The lemma follows. 
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Proposition 2 (State space partition). For all 2-player graph games with Borel objectives, the four sets W10, W01,
W11, and W00 form a partition of the state space.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that
S\(W10 ∪ W01) = {s ∈ S : Re2(s) = ∅ ∧ Re1(s) = ∅}.
It also follows that the sets W10, W01, W11, and W00 are disjoint. By deﬁnition, we have W00 ⊆ {s ∈ S : Re1(s) =
∅ ∧ Re2(s) = ∅} ⊆ S\(W10 ∪ W01). Consider T1 and T2 as deﬁned in Lemma 2. We have W00 = T1, and by Lemma
1, we have T2 ∪ W11 = S\(W10 ∪ W01). It also follows that T2 ∩ W11 = ∅, and hence T2 = (S\(W10 ∪ W01))\W11.
Therefore by Lemma 2,
T2 = T1 = W00 = (S\(W10 ∪ W01))\W11.
The proposition follows. 
Lemma 3. The following equalities hold:
SE00 ∩ SE10 = ∅,
SE01 ∩ SE10 = ∅,
SE00 ∩ SE01 = ∅.
Proof. Consider a state s ∈ SE10 and a secure equilibrium (, ) at s. Since the strategy proﬁle is secure and player 2
receives the least possible payoff, it follows that for all player 2 strategies, the payoff for player 1 cannot decrease.
Hence for all player 2 strategies ′, we have ,′(s)1. So there is no Nash equilibrium at state s which assigns
payoff 0 to player 1. Hence we have SE10∩SE01 = ∅ and SE10∩SE00 = ∅. The argument to show that SE01∩SE00 = ∅
is similar. 
Lemma 4. The following equalities hold:
SE11 ∩ SE01 = ∅,
SE11 ∩ SE10 = ∅.
Proof. Consider a state s ∈ SE11 and a secure equilibrium (, ) at s. Since the strategy proﬁle is secure, it ensures
that for all player 2 strategies ′, if ,′(s)¬1, then ,′ ¬2. Hence s /∈ SE01. Thus SE11 ∩ SE01 = ∅. The
proof that SE11 ∩ SE10 = ∅ is analogous. 
Lemma 5. The following equalities hold:
MS00 ∩ MS01 = ∅,
MS00 ∩ MS10 = ∅,
MS01 ∩ MS10 = ∅,
MS11 ∩ MS00 = ∅.
Proof. Theﬁrst three equalities follow fromLemmas 3 and 4. The last equality follows from the facts that (0, 0)1(1, 1)
and (0, 0)2(1, 1). So if s ∈ MS11, then (0, 0) cannot be a maximal secure payoff proﬁle at s. 
Lemma 6. W10 = MS10 and W01 = MS01.
Proof. Consider a state s ∈ MS10 and a secure equilibrium (, ) at s. Since player 2 receives the least possible payoff
and (, ) is a secure strategy proﬁle, it follows that for all strategies ′ of player 2, we have,′(s)1. Since (, )
is a Nash equilibrium, for all strategies ′ of player 2, we have ,′(s)¬2. Thus MS10 ⊆ W10. Now consider a
state s ∈ W10, and let  be a strongly winning strategy of player 1 at s; that is, for all strategies  of player 2, we
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have ,(s) (1 ∧ ¬2). For all strategies  of player 2, the strategy proﬁle (, ) is a secure equilibrium. Hence
s ∈ SE10. Since (1, 0) is the greatest payoff proﬁle in the preference order for player 1, we have s ∈ MS10. Therefore
W10 = MS10. Symmetrically, W01 = MS01. 
Lemma 7. W11 = MS11.
Proof. Consider a state s ∈ MS11, and let (, ) be a secure equilibrium at s. We prove that  ∈ Re1(s) and  ∈ Re2(s).
Since (, ) is a secure strategy proﬁle, for all strategies ′ of player 2, if,′(s)¬1, then,′(s)¬2. In other
words, for all strategies ′ of player 2, we have ,′(s) (2 → 1). Hence  ∈ Re1(s). Symmetrically,  ∈ Re2(s).
Thus MS11 ⊆ W11. Consider a state s ∈ W11, and let  ∈ Re1(s) and  ∈ Re2(s) such that ,(s) (1 ∧ 2). A
retaliation strategy proﬁle is, by deﬁnition, a secure strategy proﬁle. Since the strategy proﬁle (, ) assigns the greatest
possible payoff to each player, it is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore W11 ⊆ SE11 ⊆ MS11. 
Lemma 8. W00 = MS00.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas 3 and 5 that MS00 = SE00\SE11 = SE00\MS11. We will use this fact to prove
that W00 = MS00. First, consider a state s ∈ MS00. Then s /∈ (MS11 ∪ MS10 ∪ MS11), which implies that s /∈
(W11 ∪ W10 ∪ W01). By Proposition 2, it follows that s ∈ W00. Thus MS00 ⊆ W00.
Second, consider a state s ∈ W00. We claim that there is a strategy  of player 1 such that for all strategies ′ of player
2, we have ,′(s)¬2. Assume by the way of contradiction that this is not the case. Then, by Borel determinacy
there is a player 2 strategy ′′ such that for all player 1 strategies ′, we have ′,′′(s)2. It follows that either
′′ is a strongly winning strategy for player 2, or a retaliating strategy such that player 2 receives payoff 1. Hence
s /∈ W00, which is a contradiction. Thus, there is a player 1 strategy  such that for all player 2 strategies ′, we have
,′(s)¬2. Similarly, there is a player 2 strategy  such that for all player 1 strategies ′, we have ′,(s)¬1.
We claim that (, ) is a secure equilibrium. By the properties of , for every ′ we have ,′(s)¬2. A similar
argument holds for  as well. It follows that (, ) is a Nash equilibrium. The strategy proﬁle (, ) has the payoff
proﬁle (0, 0), which assigns the least possible payoff to each player. Hence it is a secure strategy proﬁle. Therefore,
s ∈ SE00. Also, s ∈ W00 implies that s /∈ W11. Since W11 = MS11, we have s ∈ SE00\MS11. Thus W00 ⊆ MS00. 
Theorem 2 (Unique maximal secure equilibria). At every state of a 2-player graph game with Borel objectives, there
exists a unique maximal secure equilibrium payoff proﬁle.
Proof. From Lemmas 6–8, it follows that for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have MSij = Wij . Using Proposition 2, the theorem
follows. 
3.2. Algorithmic characterization of secure equilibria
We now give an alternative characterization of the state sets W00, W01, W10, and W11. The new characterization
is useful to derive computational complexity results for computing the four sets when player 1 and player 2 have
-regular objectives. The characterization itself, however, is general and applies to all objectives that are Borel sets.
(We do not obtain algorithms for general Borel objectives, because even zero-sum Borel games are hard to analyze
computationally.)
It follows from the deﬁnitions that W10 = 〈〈1〉〉(1 ∧¬2) and W01 = 〈〈2〉〉(2 ∧¬1). Deﬁne A = S\(W10 ∪W01),
the set of “ambiguous” states from which neither player has a strongly winning strategy. Let Wi = 〈〈i〉〉(i ), for
i ∈ {1, 2}, be the winning sets of the two players, and let U1 = W1\W10 and U2 = W2\W01 be the sets of “weakly
winning” states for players 1 and 2, respectively. Deﬁne U = U1 ∪ U2. Note that U ⊆ A.
Lemma 9. U ⊆ W11.
Proof. Let s ∈ U1. By the deﬁnition of U1, player 1 has a strategy  from the state s to satisfy the objective1, which is
obviously a retaliating strategy, because 1 implies 2 → 1. Again by the deﬁnition of U1, we have s /∈ W10. Hence,
by the determinacy of zero-sum games (Theorem 1), player 2 has a strategy  to satisfy the objective ¬(1 ∧ ¬2),
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which is a retaliating strategy, because ¬(1 ∧ ¬2) is equivalent to 1 → 2. Clearly, we have ,(s)1 and
,(s) (1 → 2), and hence ,(s) (1 ∧ 2). The case of s ∈ U2 is symmetric. 
Example 2 shows that in general UW11. Given a game graph G = ((S,E), (S1, S2)) and a subset S′ ⊆ S of the
states, we write GS′ to denote the subgraph induced by S′, that is, GS′ = ((S′, E ∩ (S′ × S′)), (S1 ∩ S′, S2 ∩ S′)).
The following lemma characterizes the set W11.
Lemma 10. W11 = 〈〈1, 2〉〉GA(1 ∧ 2).
Proof. Let s ∈ 〈〈1, 2〉〉GA(1∧2). The case s ∈ U is covered byLemma 9; so let s ∈ A\U . Let (, ) be a cooperative
strategy proﬁle at s, that is, ,(s) (1 ∧ 2). Observe that if t ∈ A\U , then t /∈ 〈〈1〉〉G(1) and t /∈ 〈〈2〉〉G(2).
Hence, by the determinacy of zero-sum games, from every state t ∈ A\U , player 1 (resp. player 2) has a strategy 
(resp. ) to satisfy the objective ¬2 (resp. ¬1) from state s. We deﬁne the pair ( + ,  + ) of strategies from s
as follows:
• When the play reaches a state t ∈ U , the players follow their winning retaliating strategies from t . It follows from
Lemma 9 that U ⊆ W11.
• If the play has not yet reached the setU , then player 1 uses the strategy  and player 2 uses the strategy . If, however,
player 2 deviates from the strategy , then player 1 switches to the strategy  at the ﬁrst state after the deviation, and
symmetrically, as soon as player 1 deviates from , then player 2 switches to the strategy .
It is easy to observe that both strategies +  and +  are retaliating strategies, and that +,+(s) (1 ∧ 2),
because +,+(s) = ,(s). Hence s ∈ W11.
Let s /∈ 〈〈1, 2〉〉GA(1 ∧ 2). Then s /∈ W11, because for every strategy proﬁle (, ), either ,(s)¬1 or
,(s)¬2. 
By deﬁnition, the two setsW10 andW01 can be computed by solving two zero-sum gameswith conjunctive objectives.
Lemma10 shows that the setW11 canbe computedby solving amodel-checking (i.e., 1-player) problem for a conjunctive
objective. Finally, it follows from Proposition 2 that the set W00 can be obtained by set operations. This is summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Algorithmic characterization of secure equilibria). Consider a game graph G with Borel objectives 1
and 2 for the two players. The four sets W10, W01, W11, and W00 can be computed as follows:
W10 = 〈〈1〉〉G(1 ∧ ¬2),
W01 = 〈〈2〉〉G(2 ∧ ¬1),
W11 = 〈〈1, 2〉〉GA(1 ∧ 2),
W00 = S\(W10 ∪ W01 ∪ W11),
where A = S\(W10 ∪ W01).
If the two objectives 1 and 2 are -regular, then we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Computational complexity). Let n be the size of the game graph G.
• If 1 and 2 are parity objectives speciﬁed by priority functions, then if a given state lies in W10, or in W01, can be
decided in co-NP; and if a given state lies in W11, or in W00, can be decided in NP. The four sets W10, W01, W11,
and W00 can be computed in time O(n2d+1 · d!), where d is the maximal number of priorities in the two priority
functions.
• If the two objectives 1 and 2 are speciﬁed as LTL (linear temporal logic) formulas, then deciding W10, W01, W11,
and W00 is 2EXPTIME-complete. The four sets can be computed in time O(n2 × 22·log  ), where  is the sum of the
lengths of the two formulas.
Proof. If the objectives 1 and 2 are parity objectives, and d is the maximal number of priorities in the two priority
functions, then the conjunctions 1 ∧ ¬2, 2 ∧ ¬1 and 1 ∧ 2 can be expressed as Streett objectives [19] with d
pairs. The decision problem for zero-sum games with Streett objectives is in co-NP [4], the model-checking problem
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for Streett objectives can be solved in polynomial time [9], and zero-sum games with Streett objectives with d pairs
can be solved in time O(n2d+1 · d!) [6]. It follows that, for a given state s, whether s ∈ W10 and whether s ∈ W01
can be decided in co-NP, and whether s ∈ A for A = S\(W01 ∪ W10) can be decided in NP. Given the set A, whether
s ∈ W11 and whether s ∈ W00 can be decided in P, by solving a model-checking problem with Streett objectives. The
ﬁrst part of the corollary follows.
Since the decision problem for zero-sum games with LTL objectives is 2EXPTIME-complete [16], the 2EXPTIME
lower bound is immediate. We obtain the matching upper bound as follows. Let  be the sum of the lengths of the two
LTL formulas 1 and 2. LTL formulas are closed under conjunction and negation, and hence 1 ∧¬2 and 2 ∧¬1
are LTL formulas of length +2.AnLTL formula of length  can be converted into an equivalent nondeterministic Büchi
automaton of size 2 [20], and the nondeterministic Büchi automaton can be converted into an equivalent deterministic
parity automaton of size 22·log  with 2 priorities [17]. The problem then reduces to solving zero-sum parity games
obtained by the synchronous product of the game graph and the deterministic parity automaton. Since zero-sum parity
games can be solved in time O(nd) for game graphs of size n and parity objectives with d priorities [19], the upper
bound follows. 
The exact complexities of decidingwhether a state lies inW10,W01,W11, orW00 when1 and2 are parity objectives
remain open.
4. -Regular objectives
In this section, we consider special cases of graph games, where the two players have reachability, safety, Büchi,
co-Büchi, and parity objectives. For these objectives, we characterize the memory requirements for strongly winning
and retaliating strategies. Until the end of the section, let R be a reachability objective, F a safety objective, B a
Büchi objective, C a co-Büchi objective, and P a parity objective.
Proposition 3 (Conjunctive objectives). The following assertions hold.
(1) ¬R is a safety objective, and ¬F is a reachability objective.
(2) ¬C is a Büchi objective, and ¬B is a co-Büchi objective.
(3) ¬P , F ∧ P , and C ∧ P are parity objectives.
Proof. The negation of a parity objective with priority function P can be obtained as the parity objective with the
priority function P ′(s) = P(s) + 1. It follows that the negation of a Büchi objective is a co-Büchi objective, and the
negation of a co-Büchi objective is a Büchi objective.
The conjunction of a parity objective P and a co-Büchi objective C is the parity objective with the following
priority function:
P ′(s) =
{
1 if s /∈ C,
P (s) + 2 if s ∈ C.
The result for the conjunction of a parity objective P and a safety objective F follows from a similar construction
on a slightly modiﬁed game graph: every state s /∈ F is converted into a sink state (i.e., a state with a single outgoing
edge that loops back to s) and assigned priority 1; the states in F are not modiﬁed. 
While in zero-sum games played on graphs, memoryless winning strategies exist for all parity objectives [5], this is
not the case for non-zero-sum games. The following two theorems give a complete characterization.
Theorem 4 (Strongly winning strategies). If player 1 has a strongly winning strategy in a graph game where
both players have reachability, safety, Büchi, co-Büchi, or parity objectives 1 and 2, respectively, then player
1 has a memoryless strongly winning strategy if and only if there is a “+” symbol in the corresponding entry of
Table 1.
Proof. For player 1, strongly winning a non-zero-sum game with objectives 1 and 2 is equivalent to winning a
zero-sum game with the objective 1 ∧ ¬2. Hence, by the existence of memoryless winning strategies for zero-sum
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Table 1
Strongly winning strategies
2
R B C P F
F + + + + +
C + + + + −
1 B + + − − −
P + + − − −
R + − − − −
s3s2 s1
Fig. 3. A counterexample for memoryless strongly winning strategies.
Table 2
Winning retaliating strategies
2
R B C P F
F + + + + +
C + − − − −
1 B + − − − −
P + − − − −
R + − − − −
parity games [5], player 1 has memoryless strongly winning strategies if the objective 1 ∧ ¬2 is equivalent to a
parity objective. From Proposition 3 it follows that the objective 1 ∧ ¬2 is a parity objective for all “+” entries in
Table 1, except for safety–reachability, safety–safety, and reachability–reachability games. For these three cases, it is
easy to argue that memoryless strongly winning strategies exist.
We now show that player 1 does not necessarily have a memoryless strongly winning strategy in non-zero-sum games
with “−” entries in Table 1. It sufﬁces to give counterexamples for the following four cases: co-Büchi–safety, Büchi–
safety, reachability–safety, and Büchi–co-Büchi games. The results for reachability–Büchi and reachability–co-Büchi
games follow from the ﬁrst two cases by symmetry. The results for Büchi–parity and parity–parity games follow trivially
from the Büchi–co-Büchi case, and the result for parity–safety games follows trivially from the Büchi–safety case. The
game graph of Fig. 3 serves as a counterexample for all four cases of interest. For all these cases, let C = F = {s1, s2}
and B = R = {s2}. For the co-Büchi–safety case, the player 1 strategy that chooses s1 → s3 for the ﬁrst time and then
always chooses s1 → s2 is strongly winning at state s1, but the two possible memoryless strategies are not strongly
winning. For the other three cases, the player 1 strategy that alternates between the two moves available at s1 is strongly
winning, but again the two memoryless strategies are not. 
Theorem 5 (Retaliating strategies). If player 1 has a winning retaliating strategy in a graph game where both
players have reachability, safety, Büchi, co-Büchi, or parity objectives1 and2, respectively, then player 1 has a mem-
oryless winning retaliating strategy if and only if there is a “+” symbol in the corresponding entry of
Table 2.
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R1R2 s3 s0 s1 s2
Fig. 4. A counterexample for memoryless winning retaliating strategies.
Proof. First we show that player 1 has memoryless winning retaliating strategies in parity–reachability and safety–
parity games. Recall the weakly winning sets U1 = W1\W10 and U2 = W2\W01, where Wi = 〈〈i〉〉(i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
In U1 ⊆ W11 player 1 uses her memoryless winning strategy in the zero-sum game with the objective P . In W11\U1
player 1 uses a memoryless strategy that shortens the distance in the game graph to the set U1. This strategy is a
winning retaliating strategy for player 1 in U1, because it satisﬁes the objective P . We prove that it is also a winning
retaliating strategy for player 1 in W11\U1, that is, satisfaction of the objective R implies satisfaction of the objective
P . Observe that R ∩ (W11\U1) = ∅. Otherwise there would be a state in W11\U1 in which the objective R of player
2 is satisﬁed and player 2 has a strategy to satisfy ¬P , and hence the state belongs to W01; this however contradicts
W11 ∩ W01 = ∅. Therefore, as long as a player stays in W11\U1, the objective R cannot be satisﬁed. On the other
hand, if player 2 cooperates with player 1 in reaching U1, then player 1 plays her memoryless retaliating strategy in U1.
The proof for safety–parity games is similar. There, the key observation is that W11\U1 ⊆ F , where F is the safety
objective of player 1.
Wenowargue that player 1 does not havememorylesswinning retaliating strategies in gameswith “−” entries inTable
2. It sufﬁces to give counterexamples for the nine cases that result from co-Büchi, Büchi, or reachability objectives for
player 1, and Büchi, co-Büchi, or safety objectives for player 2. The remaining seven cases involving parity objectives
follow as corollaries, because Büchi and co-Büchi objectives are special cases of parity objectives. The game graph of
Fig. 4 serves as a counterexample for all nine cases: take C1 = B1 = R1 = {s2} and B2 = C2 = F2 = {s0, s1, s2},
where C1, B1, and R1 are the co-Büchi, Büchi, and reachability objectives of player 1, respectively, and B2, C2, and
F2 are the Büchi, co-Büchi, and safety objectives of player 2. It can be veriﬁed that in each of the nine games neither
of the two memoryless strategies for player 1 is a winning retaliating strategy at state s0, but the strategy that ﬁrst
chooses the move s0 → s1 and then chooses s0 → s3 if player 2 chooses s1 → s0, is a winning retaliating strategy for
player 1. 
Note that if both players have parity objectives, then at all states in W00 memoryless retaliation strategy proﬁles exist.
To see this, consider a state s ∈ W00. There are a player 1 strategy  and a player 2 strategy  such that, for all strategies
 of player 1 and  of player 2, we have ,(s)¬1 and ,(s)¬2. The strategy proﬁle (, ) is a retaliation
strategy proﬁle. If the objectives 1 and 2 are both parity objectives, then ¬1 and ¬2 are parity objectives as well.
Hence there are memoryless strategies  and  that satisfy the above condition.
5. n-Player games
We generalize the deﬁnition of secure equilibria to the case of n > 2 players. We show that in n-player games on
graphs, in contrast to the 2-player case, there may not be a unique maximal secure equilibrium. The preference ordering
≺i for player i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is deﬁned as follows: given two n-player payoff proﬁles v = (v1, . . . , vn) and
v′ = (v′1, . . . , v′n) we have
v ≺i v′ iff (v′i > vi) ∨ (v′i = vi ∧ (∀j = i. v′j vj ) ∧ (∃j = i. v′j < vj )).
In other words, player i prefers v′ over v iff she gets a greater payoff in v′, or (1) she gets equal payoff in v′ and v,
(2) the payoffs of all other players are no higher in v′ than in v, and (3) there is at least one player who gets a lower
payoff in v′ than in v. Given an n-player strategy proﬁle  = (1, . . . , n), we deﬁne the corresponding payoff proﬁle
as v = (v1 , . . . , vn), where vi is the payoff for player i when all players choose their strategies from the strategy
proﬁle . Given a strategy ′i for player i, we write (−i , ′i ) for the n-player strategy proﬁle where each player j = i
plays the strategy j , and player i plays the strategy ′i . An n-player strategy proﬁle  is a Nash equilibrium if for all
players i and all strategies ′i of player i, if ′ = (−i , ′i ), then vi v
′
i .
K. Chatterjee et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 365 (2006) 67–82 81
Deﬁnition 7 (Secure n-player proﬁles). An n-player strategy proﬁle  is secure if for all players i and j = i, and for
all strategies ′j of player j , if ′ = (−j , ′j ), then (v
′
j vj ) → (v
′
i vi ). 
Observe that if a secure n-player proﬁle  is interpreted as a contract between the players, then any unilateral selﬁsh
deviation from  must be cooperative in the following sense: if player j deviates from the contract  by playing a
strategy ′j (i.e., the new strategy proﬁle is ′ = (−j , ′j )) which gives her an advantage (i.e., v
′
j vj ), then every
player i = j is not put at a disadvantage if she follows the contract (i.e., v′i vi ). By symmetry, the player j enjoys
the same security against unilateral selﬁsh deviations by other players.
Deﬁnition 8 (Secure n-player equilibria). An n-player strategy proﬁle  is a secure equilibrium if  is both a Nash
equilibrium and secure. 
Similar to Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 (Equivalent characterization). An n-player strategy proﬁle  is a secure equilibrium iff for all players
i, there does not exist a strategy ′i of player i such that ′ = (−i , ′i ) and v ≺i v
′
.
We give an example of a 3-player graph game where the maximal secure equilibrium payoff proﬁle is not unique.
Recall the game graph from Fig. 3, and consider a 3-player game on this graph where each player has a reachability
objective. The target set for player 1 is {s2, s3}; for player 2 it is {s2}; and for player 3 it is {s3}. In state s1 player 1 can
choose between the two successors s2 and s3. If player 1 chooses s1 → s3, then the payoff proﬁle is (1, 0, 1), and if
player 1 chooses s1 → s2, then the payoff proﬁle is (1, 1, 0). Both are secure equilibria and maximal, but incomparable.
6. Conclusion
We considered non-zero-sum graph games with lexicographically ordered objectives for the players in order to
capture adversarial external choice, where each player tries to minimize the other player’s payoff as long as this does
not decrease her own payoff. We showed that these games have a unique maximal equilibrium for all Borel winning
conditions. This conﬁrms that secure equilibria provide a good formalization of rational behavior in the context of
verifying component-based systems.
Concretely, suppose the two players represent two components of a system with the speciﬁcations 1 and 2,
respectively. Classically, component-wise veriﬁcation would prove that for an initial state s, player 1 can satisfy the
objective 1 no matter what player 2 does (i.e., s ∈ 〈〈1〉〉(1)), and player 2 can satisfy the objective 2 no matter
what player 1 does (i.e., s ∈ 〈〈2〉〉(2)). Together, these two proof obligations imply that the composite system satisﬁes
both speciﬁcations 1 and 2. The computational gain from this method typically arises from abstracting the opposing
player’s (i.e., the environment’s)moves for each proof obligation.Our framework provides twoweaker proof obligations
that support the same conclusion. We ﬁrst showed that player 1 can satisfy 1 provided player 2 does not sabotage her
ability to satisfy 2, that is, we show that s ∈ (W10 ∪ W11): either player 1 has a strongly winning strategy, or there is
a winning pair of retaliating strategies. This condition is strictly weaker than the condition that player 1 has a winning
strategy, and therefore it is satisﬁed by more states. Second, we showed the symmetric proof obligation that player 2
can satisfy 2 provided that player 1 does not sabotage her ability to satisfy 1, that is, s ∈ (W01 ∪ W11). While they
are weaker than their classical counterparts, both new proof obligations together still sufﬁce to establish that s ∈ W11,
that is, the composite system satisﬁes 1 ∧ 2 assuming that both players behave rationally and follow the winning
pair of retaliating strategies.
It should be noted that the other possible lexicographic ordering of objectives captures cooperative external choice,
where each player tries to maximize the other player’s payoff as long as it does not decrease her own payoff. However,
cooperation does not uniquely determine a preferable behavior: there may be multiple maximal payoff proﬁles for
cooperative external choice, even for reachability objectives. To see this, deﬁne (v1, v2) ≺co1 (v′1, v′2) iff (v1 < v′1) ∨
(v1 = v′1 ∧ v2 < v′2); and deﬁne (v1, v2)co1 (v1, , v′2) iff (v1, v2) ≺co1 (v′1, v′2) or (v1, v2) = (v′1, v′2). A symmetric
deﬁnition yields co2 . A cooperative equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with respect to the preference orders co1 and
co2 on payoff proﬁles. Recall the game shown in Fig. 4, where each player has a reachability objective. The target for
player 1 is s2, and the target for player 2 is s3. The possible cooperative equilibria at state s0 are as follows: player 1
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chooses s0 → s1 and player 2 chooses s1 → s2, or player 1 chooses s0 → s3 and player 2 chooses s1 → s0. The former
equilibrium has the payoff proﬁle (1, 0), and the latter has the payoff proﬁle (0, 1). These are the only cooperative
equilibria and, therefore, the maximal payoff proﬁle for cooperative equilibria is not unique.
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